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CONFUSION SURROUNDING TITLE VI AND THE
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT REQUIREMENT:
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION V. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits racial discrimi-
nation in federally funded programs.' Congress failed to define the
term "discrimination," 3 however, thereby creating uncertainty4 as to
whether it intended to require proof of discriminatory intent5 to es-
tablish a Title VI violation, or whether evidence of discriminatory
effects6 would suffice. In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Com-
mission,' a divided Supreme Court' found discriminatory intent nec-
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1982).
2. Id § 2000d. This section provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id
3. Title VI generated considerable debate because of the lack of specificity sur-
rounding the term "discrimination." For example, in a congressional debate concern-
ing the meaning of discrimination under Title VI, one senator stated that Congress
..must set up a definition and legal standards in a bill for the bill to be constitutional.
This has not been done." 110 CONG. REC. 5863 (1964) (statement of Sen. Eastland).
Congressmen opposing the bill expressed concern that the federal goverment would
possess dangerously broad powers because of the many programs that receive federal
aid and because "discrimination" is a broad term. Some congressmen feared that the
lack of a clear standard would permit the government to cut off federal funds for
political reasons. See, e.g., id at 1619 (statements of Rep. Abernathy); id at 1632
(statements of Rep. Dowdy); id at 5251 (statements of Sen. Talmadge); id at 5612
(statements of Sen. Ervin).
4. This uncertainty is illustrated by several Title VI cases that have reached oppo-
site conclusions on the proper discrimination standard. For a list of these cases, see
infra note 48.
5. A discriminatory intent standard requires the plaintiff to show that the defend-
ant acted out of racial animus. See Note, Intent or Impact: Proving Discrimination
Under Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1095, 1096 (1982).
See also Comment, Title YI: The Second Circuit Sidestep, 47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 827,
831 (1981).
6. See Comment, supra note 5, which defines a discriminatory effect as "a dispa-
rate racial impact unjustified by a legitimate governmental purpose .. " Id
7. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983).
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essary to establish a Title VI violation.9
Guardians involved the New York City Police Department's
(NYCPD's) appointment of new recruits based upon their scores on
several written exams.'0 Blacks and Hispanics generally scored lower
on the exams, and thus were hired later." Consequently, when the
NYCPD began laying off officers on a "last-hired, first-fired" basis, 12
blacks and Hispanics suffered disproportionately.' 3 The discharged
officers filed suit' 4 alleging that the layoffs violated their rights under
8. The Guardians Court reached a 5-4 decision, consisting of six different opin-
ions. Id See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 3229. See infra 49-65 and accompanying text.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 3223. For discussion and examples of the examinations in ques-
tion, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 238-47, 269-70 (2d
Cir. 1980).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 3223.
12. Id For a discussion of the "last-hired, first-fired" method of seniority, see
Blumrosen & Blumrosen, Layoff or Work Sharing.: The Civii Rights Act of 1964 in the
Recession of 1975, 7 Civ. RIGHTS DIG., Spring 1975, at 35; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED-LAYOFFS AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1977).
13. 103 S. Ct. at 3223. An independent study by Rand Institute verified the pres-
ence of a disproportionate impact. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F.
Supp. 526, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. The plaintiffs began this legal battle in 1972, when they unsuccessfully sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent the NYCPD from making appointments based
upon the examinations. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 400 (2d
Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs filed the suit in question, concerning "last-hired, first-fired" lay-
offs, in 1976. The district court found no discriminatory intent, but held that since the
exams produced a disparate impact on minorities and were not job-related, their use
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16
(1982)) (prohibiting employment discrimination). 431 F. Supp. 526, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). The court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the NYCPD from fir-
ing or recalling any officers until it revised the seniority lists. Id. at 551. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this decision, citing International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (unpublished opinion); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (explaining the ra-
tionale of the court of appeals decision to vacate and remand). The Teamsters Court
found that a bona fide seniority system established before Title VII became effective
is not subject to Title VII requirements if it merely creates a discriminatory effect. 431
U.S. at 348-55.
Because the seniority system in Guardians met these requirements, the court of ap-
peals ruled that the district court had erred in granting the preliminary injunction.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (on remand after
court of appeals vacated preliminary injunction). On remand, the district court again
restored seniority rights, but only to those class members hired after Title VII became
effective. Guardians, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The court then con-
sidered Title VI, which became effective before the layoffs occurred. It granted the
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Title VI.' 5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief,'6
holding that establishing a Title VI violation requires proof of dis-
criminatory intent. 1" A fragmented 8 Supreme Court affirmed.' 9
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 196420 to protect the basic
civil rights of United States citizens.2 ' As one way to achieve this
goal, Congress included Title VI to deny federal funds to programs
operating in a racially discriminatory manner.22 Congress, however,
failed to specify whether Title VI should apply to programs that
merely cause discriminatory effects, or whether it should apply only
to programs evincing intentional discrimination. The legislative his-
tory does not clearly support either contention.23
plaintiffs compensatory seniority and restored the preliminary injunction against
NYCPD's seniority-based employment policy. Id at 1287. The court of appeals af-
firmed the result under Title VII, but denied the relief granted under Title VI.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme
Court affirmed. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983).
15. Plaintiffs also brought a Title VII claim. See supra note 14.
16. 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra note 14.
17. 633 F.2d at 247-54. Although the court's decision was unanimous, its reason-
ing was split. Two judges based their decision on lack of discriminatory intent, id at
272-75, while the third felt that Title VI did not provide a compensatory private rem-
edy. Id at 255-62.
18. A 5-4 vote affirmed the lower court, but the Justices authored six separate
opinions on the matter. 103 S. Ct. 3221. See supra note 8 and infra notes 49-65 and
accompanying text.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 3235.
Another case involving the validity of a "last-hired, first-fired" seniority system,
although arising under Title VII rather that Title VI, is Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). In Stotts, the Court ruled that the district court
had erred in modifying a consent decree under which the city had adopted a goal of
increasing the number of blacks in the fire department. Id at 2590. The modification
had prohibited the city from laying off blacks if such layoffs would reduce the propor-
tion of blacks in certain job categories. Id at 2581.
20. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1982)).
21. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2391.
22. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978).
23. Examples of legislative history that lend some support to an effects standard
for Title VI include: "The powers sought in this title would affect virtually every
man, woman, and child, business and other institutions in this country." 110 CONG.
REC. 1703 (remarks of Rep. Winstead); "This is a strong bill and the strongest provi-
sion in the bill," id at 2469 (remarks of Rep. Libonati); "It is. . .unconscionable that
discrimination still exists in. . .some federally assisted programs. The taxes which
support these programs are paid . . . by all citizens. It is simple justice all citizens
1984]
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Through section 602 of Title VI,2' Congress placed the burden of
implementation and enforcement on the administrative agencies that
disburse federal grants and funds.25 Section 602 requires these agen-
cies to establish rules and regulations consistent with the objectives of
Title VI.26 An organization must observe these rules and regulations
to acquire and continue receiving federal funds.2 7 Most agencies use
the model Title VI regulations28 created by a presidential task force
shortly after Title VI became effective.29
The Supreme Court first addressed Title VI in Lau v. Nichols.3" In
Lau, the San Francisco school system failed to provide supplemental
should derive equal benefits from these programs." Id at 6561 (remarks of Sen.
Kuchel).
Examples of legislative history that may indicate an intent standard for Title VI
include: "The harsh facts are that constitutionally protected rights have been disre-
garded in the administration of Federal programs." .Id at 2481 (remarks of Rep.
Ryan); "Title VI has now been modified. . . to provide enormous safeguards. . . in
connection with protecting the rights of states, localities and institutions against arbi-
trary cutoff of Federal Funds." Id at 5243 (remarks of Sen. Clark).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982). This section directs departments and agencies
that disburse federal funds to adopt rules and regulations consistent with the statute's
objectives. It also empowers the agencies and departments to enforce the adopted
rules by refusing to grant federal assistance or by terminating federal assistance after
a hearing. Id
25. Id
26. Id.
27. Id
28. The departments referred to and their regulations include: Agriculture, 7
C.F.R. §§ 15.1-15b.42 (1984); Commerce, 15 C.F.R. §§ 8.1-.15 (1984); Defense, 32
C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.14 (1984); Education, 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-.13 (1984); Energy, 10
C.F.R. §§ 1040.1-.14 (1984); Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13
(1984); Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R. §§ 17.1-.12 (1984); Interior, 43
C.F.R. §§ 17.1-.12 (1984); Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-.540 (1984); Labor, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 31.1-.12 (1984); State, 22 C.F.R. §§ 141.1-.12 (1984); Transportation, 49 C.F.R.
§§ 21.1-.23 (1984); Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 51.224 (1984).
29. In response to a presidential directive, the Justice Department, the Bureau of
Budget, the Civil Rights Commission, and representatives from the White House
formed a task force to draw up the model regulations. See Comment, Title VI ofthe
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Imlementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824,
845-46 (1968). The task force first developed regulations for the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), then used this as a standard for all the other
departments. These regulations establish an "effects" test. Id at 826. For an exam-
ple of a typical regulation, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1984), which provides that a
recipient of federal funds may not "utilize criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, or national origin. . . ." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1984).
30. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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language instruction to numerous children of Chinese ancestry who
did not speak English.3 The Court found a Title VI violation even
though the plaintiffs never proved the school district intended to dis-
criminate against these students.32 A substantial part of the Court's
rationale concerned the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW)33 Title VI implementing regulations.34 The HEW regu-
lations used an effects standard35 and the Court found that when the
school district accepted federal aid it agreed to abide by the
regulations.36
Justice Stewart, concurring in Lau, went a step further and con-
firmed the validity of section 602 of Title VI.37 He cited Mourning v.
Family Publication Services,38 in which the Court held that imple-
menting regulations created under provisions similar to section 602
were valid if reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation.39
Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, concluded that an effects standard is reasonably related to the
purposes of Title VI.4 °
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,4 the Court
again addressed the Title VI interpretation problem. Bakke, a white
applicant to a state medical school, claimed he was wrongly denied
admission because of his race.42 The school's affirmative action pro-
31. Id at 564. The school district made supplemental English courses available
only to about 1,000 of the 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who did not speak Eng-
lish. Id
32. Id at 569-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
33. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1976). The Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare is now the Department of Health and Human Services.
34. 414 U.S. at 564 (1974). Both Justice Douglas' majority opinion and Justice
Stewart's concurrence made the implementing regulations a crucial factor in their
decision. Id at 566-69; id at 569-72 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3(b)(2), (3) (1976). For a definition of a "discriminatory ef-
fect," see supra note 6.
36. 414 U.S. at 568-69.
37. id at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
39. Id at 369. Mourning concerned implementing regulations created by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board for the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). Id at 358.
40. 414 U.S. at 571. The remainder of the unanimous Lau Court, by using § 602
as the basis for their decision, implicitly indicated that a reasonable relationship ex-
isted between an effects standard and the goals of Title VI. Id at 569.
41. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. Id at 277-78. Bakke applied to the University of California at Davis in 1973
1984]
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gram set aside a number of spaces in each entering class for members
of disadvantaged minorities. It used race as a factor in selecting ap-
plicants to fill those spaces.43 A majority of the Court considered
Title VI in relation to the Constitution." They found that Title VI
incorporates a constitutional standard of discrimination and thus
only prohibits intentional discrimination.45 The Court stated this
conclusion in dictum,46 however, making it uncertain whether Bakke
and 1974. In both years minority students with grade point averages and MCAT
scores significantly lower than Bakke's scores gained admission through the school's
affirmative action program. Id at 277 n.7.
43. Id at 272-76.
44. Id at 281-87 (opinion of Powell, J.); id at 352-55 (opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
45. Id (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). Washington v. Davis
and other cases involving different parts of the Civil Rights Act suggest that constitu-
tional and statutory tests differ. Washington involved a challenge to police depart-
ment hiring procedures brought by applicants rejected because of poor results on a
verbal skills test. Id at 232-36. The Court rejected the challengers' claim that the
procedures violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution (U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § I as applied to the District of Columbia through the fifth amendment
due process clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V). It held that proof of discriminatory in-
tent was necessary to sustain such a claim. Id at 238-48. The Court then evaluated
the plaintiffs' claim under the District of Columbia version of Title VII and found
against the plaintiffs on that claim as well, because the tests bore a direct relation to
the requirements of the police training program. Id at 249-52. By disposing of the
Title VII claim separately, the Court implied that the constitutional standard may
differ from the statutory standard. Washington, therefore, let stand the Court's earlier
ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), that plaintiffs could estab-
lish a Title VII violation without having to prove defendants' discriminatory intent.
Under Griggs, plaintiffs can prevail merely by showing that a hiring criterion has a
discriminatory impact and is insufficiently job-related. 401 U.S. at 431.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), the Court considered a challenge under the equal protection clause and Title
VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982), to the Village's refusal to rezone land to permit
the construction of low-income housing. 429 U.S. at 254. The Court ruled against the
plaintiffs on the equal protection claim, holding that they had failed to establish the
requisite intent to discriminate. 1d at 268-71. The Court, however, remanded the
case for determination of the Title VIII issue, id at 271, clearly implying that a differ-
ent standard applies to Title VIII claims than to equal protection clause claims. On
remand, the lower court used a discriminatory effects standard to evaluate the plain-
tiffs claim. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). For a discussion of the differ-
ing constitutional and statutory standards within the Title VIII framework, see Com-
ment, Schmidt v. Boston Housing Authority: Racial Classi/lcations in Public Housing,
23 URBAN L. ANN. 343, 352-53 (1982).
46. The Court ordered Bakke admitted because the defendant failed to prove that
Bakke's application would have been rejected even in the absence of an affirmative
action program. Therefore, the intent requirement is dictum and at least one corn-
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actually overruled Lau.4 ' The ensuing confusion is exemplified by
the subsequent divergent standards lower courts have used to deter-
mine Title VI violations.48
The Guardians Court approached the Title VI question from sev-
eral perspectives. Justice White, announcing the judgment of the
Court, stated that an effects test sufficiently proved a Title VI viola-
tion for two reasons.49 First, he found that Bakke did not overrule
Lau because the cases involved different issues and, therefore, Lau is
still valid." Alternatively, Justice White concluded that even if
Bakke demanded that Title VI follow an intent standard, failure to
mentator suggests that Bakke does not overrule Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(see supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text). See Note, supra note 5, at 1098-99.
47. One commentator suggests that Bakke did not overrule Lau because:
1) Neither Justice Powell nor Justice Brennan expressed any desire to overrule Lau,
2) different issues confronted the court (see infra note 50); 3) Justice Powell and Jus-
tice Brennan may have limited Title VI to a constitutional standard only because they
feared not doing so would prohibit affirmative action programs; and 4) the Supreme
Court implicitly acknowledged that Bakke did not address the type of standard re-
quired in a Title VI claim. Note, supra note 5, at 1098-1101.
In Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), however, the Court seemed to
uphold an intent standard for Title VI, when it found that a "violation of Title VI
may result in a cutoff of all federal funds, and it is likely that Congress would wish
this drastic result only when the discrimination is intentional." 'Id at 150. The Court,
however, did not decide Harrison Title VI grounds, therefore the statement is dictum.
But cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479 (1980) (the Court indicated that ad-
ministrative implementing regulations using an effects standard are valid).
48. Since Bakke, some courts have upheld an effects standard. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (a hospital's plan to relocate,
which has a disparate impact on minorities, violates Title VI); Guadelupe Org., Inc. v.
Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978) (providing non-
English speaking students with remedial English instruction satisfies the Lau standard
and creates no discriminatory effect); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (disparate impact is sufficient to prove a municipal service violation
of Title VI). Other courts have used an intent standard. See, e.g., Harris v. White,
479 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1979) (plaintiffs failure to show intentional discrimina-
tion defeats a Title VI claim); Valdez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(defendant's policies did not discriminate invidiously, thus no Title VI violation);
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 470 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 1979)
(recovery under Title VI requires discriminatory intent; discriminatory impact does
not suffice).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 3225-27.
50. Id. at 3225-26. Justice White determined that the issue in Bakke was whether
Title VI forbids intentional but remedial discrimination that is permitted by the Con-
stitution. Id at 3226. Nevertheless, he stated that Lau addressed the question of
whether Title VI proscribes unintentional discrimination as well as intentional
nonremedial discrimination. Id.
1984]
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comply with the administrative agency implementing regulations can
establish a violation.5 Nevertheless, Justice White denied recovery,
arguing that compensatory relief is not available for past uninten-
tional Title VI violations. 2 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, denied relief on the ground that discriminatory intent is es-
sential to a Title VI infraction,5" agency regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. 4 He based this conclusion on his opinion in
Bakke55 which stated that Title VI only reaches as far as the equal
protection clause or the fifth amendment. 6 Justice Rehnquist also
found discriminatory intent essential, but believed that the adminis-
trative implementing regulations were valid.5 7 He joined Justice
White's opinion in denying compensatory relief to the plaintiffs.5 8
Justice O'Connor determined that discriminatory intent is necessary
for a Title VI violation and, therefore, the implementing regulations
using an effects test were invalid.59
Justice Marshall, dissenting, concluded that discriminatory effects
sufficed to prove a Title VI violation. 6° The Justice based his deci-
5 I. Id at 3226-27.
52. Id at 3229-34. Justice White, however, would allow prospective injunctive
relief under Title VI against actions having unintentional discriminatory effects. Id
at 3231-32 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id at 3235-37. Justice Powell found that Bakke overruled Lau. Id Powell,
however, rested his conclusion upon a different argument. Justice Powell and Chief
Justice Burger asserted that Title VI does not permit a private cause of action. Id at
3235-36. The other Justices disagree, however, id at 3227-29, 3257, 3250-52, and in
previous cases, the Court has upheld the right of private litigants to sue for civil rights
violations. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (allowed a
private right of action under Title IX and stated that Title VI and Title IX should be
interpreted consistently); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(allowed applicant denied admission to sue the school); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
284 (1976) (permitted tenants to sue housing authority); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974) (allowed class action suit by students against a school district). See generally
Comment, Civil Rights: Title VI--Is a Private Right ofAction Intended, 19 WASH-
BURN L.J. 565 (1980) (concluding that a private right of action is intended).
54. 103 S. Ct. at 3237 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. 438 U.S. at 281-87.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 3236 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Id at 3237. Justice Rehnquist did not write his own opinion, but instead con-
curred with portions of other opinions. His decision consisted of Parts I, III, IV, and
V of Justice White's opinion, id at 3223-25, 3227-34, and Part II of Justice Powell's
opinion. Id at 3236-37.
58. Id at 3227-34.
59. Id at 3237-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id at 3239-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sion upon the effects standard used in the implementing regula-
tions,6" coupled with Congress' failure to alter these regulations for
two decades.62 Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun also dis-
sented.63 They found that Bakke clearly created an intent standard
for Title VI, 4 but also determined that the implementing regulations
permitted compensatory relief.
65
The Guardians Court had an opportunity to clarify the necessary
factors for obtaining relief under Title VI. Unfortunately, as Justice
Powell noted, this decision will serve only to "confuse rather than
guide."' 66 The Court's stand on the "effect-intent" question is fairly
clear--seven of nine Justices believed that a Title VI violation re-
quires proof of discriminatory intent.67 Five Justices, however, felt
that implementing regulations that specified an effects test are valid.68
Also, a different set of five Justices asserted either directly or indi-
rectly69 that they would not permit compensatory relief without dis-
criminatory intent.7" Because of the varying rationales it is difficult
to discern just what the Court as a whole actually intended.7
61. Id at 3240-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 29 (discussion of the
implementing regulations).
62 103 S. Ct. at 3241-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In 1966 the House of Repre-
sentatives voted on and defeated a proposal to require a Title VI intent standard. 112
CoNG. REC. 18,715 (1966).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 3249-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id at 3252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justices stated that "proof of in-
vidious purpose is a necessary component of a valid Title VI claim." Id at 3253
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id at 3253-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 3235 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. Id at 3235 n.l (Powell, J., concurring).
68. Id at 3235 n.27.
69. Justices White and Rehnquist explicitly spoke out against compensatory re-
lief. Id at 3229-34. See supra text accompanying notes 49 & 58. Justice Powell and
Chief Justice Burger would not permit a private cause of action. It therefore follows
that they would not allow compensatory relief for a private party. See supra note 53
and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor would deny any relief, including compen-
satory damages, absent proof of discriminatory intent. See supra text accompanying
note 59.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 3235 n.27.
71. Although a majority found discriminatory intent necessary, and a majority
found a right of action for discriminatory effects violating administrative regulations,
the question of what relief is available remains unanswered. This case also leaves
other issues unsettled. If the regulations are valid but compensatory relief is unavail-
able, what incentive would a private party have to file suit? If an effects test cannot
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The Court has distinguished standards for statutory claims from
standards for constitutional claims in other titles of the Civil Rights
Act.72 In Guardians, however, no such distinction is made, appar-
ently because of the dictum in Bakke finding Title VI incorporated
the constitutional standard.73 Although legislative history fails to
support clearly either an intent or an effects standard,74 a congres-
sional desire for an effects standard is evident through negative infer-
ence. Congress delegated the responsibility for implementing Title
VI to administrative agencies.7 5 These agencies created regulations
76
to carry out the goals of Title VI.77 Because Congress has not ob-
jected to these regulations, 78 its approval of them may be inferred.
Finally, the Supreme Court itself applied the effects test in Lau9 and
in cases involving other titles of the Civil Rights Act.8 0
The Guardians decision leaves a cloud of uncertainty over Title VI.
The shift in opinions from Lau to Guardians8" indicates that the
Court desires an intent standard for Title VI. Guardians will provide
additional support for the intent standard in subsequent Title VI ac-
tions and future plaintiffs will shoulder a heavier burden of proof.
Edmund J Postawko
establish a violation, is the entire spectrum of relevant administrative regulations un-
enforceable, or only certain portions?
72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. 438 U.S. at 281-87 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 328-55 (opinion of Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
74. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982). See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 62.
79. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 45.
81. In Lau, a unanimous Court upheld an effects standard. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
In Guardians, seven Justices voted for an intent standard. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983). See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/13
